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Abstract
This article aims to consider the conventional, analog, mission planning 
process with the objective of  identifying the decision making constraints 
and challenges for digitization. Prototypes of  digital mission planning sys-
tems are beginning to be devised and demonstrated, but there has been 
concern expressed over the design of  such systems which fail to under-
stand and incorporate the human aspects of  socio-technical systems 
design. Previous research has identified many of  the potential pitfalls of  
failing to take Human Factors considerations into account as well as the 
multiplicity of  constraints acting on the planners and planning process. 
An analysis of  mission planning in a Battle Group is presented, based on 
an observational study by the authors. This study illustrates the efficiency 
of  an analog process which has evolved over many generations to form 
the Combat Estimate, a process that is mirrored by forces throughout the 
world. The challenges for digitization include ensuring that the mission 
planning process remains easy and involving, preserving the public nature 
of  the products, encouraging the collaboration and cooperation of  the 
planners, and maintaining the flexibility, adaptability and speed of  the 
analog planning process. It is argued that digitization should not become 
an additional constraint on mission planning.
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Introduction to mission planning
Mission failure is often thought to be the result of  poor mission 
planning (Levchuk et al. 2002), which places considerable demands 
on the planners and the planning process. This observation is fur-
ther confounded by the two general principles of  warfare. The first 
principle is that of  the “fog of  war” (i.e., the many uncertainties 
about the true nature of  the environment, Clausewitz 1832) and 
second the principle that “no battle plan survives contact with the 
enemy” (i.e., no matter how thorough the planning is, the enemy is 
unlikely to be compliant and may act in unpredictable ways, von 
Moltke n.d.). These three factors (i.e., the effects of  uncertainty, the 
enemy, and failure on mission planning) require the planning pro-
cess to be robust, auditable, and flexible. Mission planning has to 
be a continuous, iterative and adaptable process, optimizing mission 
goals, resources, and constraints (Levchuck 2002). Roth et al. (2006) 
argue that the defining characteristic of  command and control is the 
continual adaptation to a changing environment. Constant change 
in the goals, priorities, scale of  operations, information sources, 
and systems being used means that the planning systems need to 
be extremely adaptable to cope with these changes. According to 
Klein and Miller (1999) there are many constraints acting on mis-
sion planning, including scarcity of  resources, time pressure, uncer-
tainty of  information, availability of  expertise, and the structure of  
the tasks to be undertaken. Mission planning requires knowledge 
of  the domain, objects in the domain and their relationships as well 
as the constraints acting on the domain, the objects and their rela-
tions (Kieweit et al. 2005). They also note that the planning cycles 
can range from a couple of  hours to a few days depending upon the 
complexity of  the situation and the time available. Given all of  the 
constraints acting on the planning process and the need for the plan 
to be continually revised and modified in light of  the enemy actions 
and changing situation, Klein and Miller (1999) argue that “simpler 
plans might allow better implementation and easier modification” 
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(Ibid., 219). This point is reinforced by Riley et al. (2006) who assert 
that “plans need to be simple, modifiable, flexible, and developed so 
that they are quickly and easily understood” (Ibid., 1143). 
Mission planning is an essential and integral part of  battle manage-
ment. Although there are some differences within and between the 
armed services (and the coalition forces) in the way they go about 
mission planning, there are also some generally accepted aspects that 
all plans need to assess. These invariants include: enemy strength, 
activity and assumed intentions, the goals of  the mission, analysis 
of  the constraints in the environment, the intent of  the commander, 
developing courses of  action, choosing a course of  action, identi-
fying resource requirements, synchronizing the assets and actions, 
and identifying control measures. A summary of  the planning pro-
cess for the United States Army may be found in Riley et al. (2006) 
and the Canadian Army may be found in Prefontaine (2002). Their 
description has much in common with land-based planning in the 
British Army, which is described in The Combat Estimate booklet 
(UK MoD 2007).
Observation of  Mission Planning in a Battle Group
The mission planning process has been observed by the authors at the 
Land Warfare Centre at Warminster in the United Kingdom and on 
training exercises in Germany. The observations at Warminster have 
been both as participant-observers and as normal observers. The 
processes observed describe UK doctrine only, although there are 
some parallels with planning doctrine in other nations. In the case 
study described in this article, the authors undertook direct observa-
tions of  the planning processes, sitting in the planning cell within 
the Battle Group Head Quarters while recording the actions of  staff  
officers and photographing the products that they produced. When 
time permitted they asked questions of  clarification directly to the 
staff  officers. All of  the authors were Human Factors researchers 
whom were well versed in Human Factors methods (Stanton et al. 
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2005). The findings from the study, as presented in this article, were 
presented back to the staff  officers at the end of  the exercises to 
check that the interpretations were valid. Therefore, this research 
may be considered to be an exploratory study of  the traditional 
(non-digital) planning processes.
This article is based upon single case study research of  an exercise 
in Germany, an approach used previously by researchers explor-
ing the military planning process (Klein and Miller 1999; Riley et 
al. 2006; Roth et al. 2006). This is a recognized approach within 
Human Factors with numerous researchers developing methodol-
ogies describing the process of  developing theory from case study 
research. Glaser and Strauss outline Grounded Theory (1967), 
a method based around constant comparison of  data and theory, 
highlighting the emergence of  theoretical categories solely from 
evidence. Additionally, researchers such as Eisenhardt (1989) have 
developed processes to validate the development of  theory from 
case study research as well as arguing the benefits of  such a research 
stance. Eisenhardt (1989) argues that such theory building is more 
likely to develop novel theory; more likely to develop testable the-
ory with readily measurable constructs; and more likely to develop 
empirically valid theory as it is so intimately tied to evidence. 
This section describes the observed activities in the planning pro-
cess following a Warning Order received from Brigade. For the pur-
pose of  this analysis, only the conventional materials (whiteboards, 
maps, overlays, paper, flip charts and staff  officers’ notebooks) were 
examined. As Figure 1 shows, the planning is undertaken in a public 
environment where various people contribute and all can view the 
products. This public nature of  the products is particularly useful at 
the briefings, which encourages collaboration and cooperation. It 
also helps to focus the planners’ minds on the important issues and 
the command intent.
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Figure 1.  Battle Group Head Quarters – Public Planning Area (G5)
The following vignette describes how a Battle Group Head Quarters 
was observed to conduct itself  in the planning process. While other 
Battle Group Head Quarters might vary, the basic themes are likely 
to be similar in the processes they follow and products they produce.
Warning Order from Brigade arrived
The Warning Order (WO) arrived and was handed to the Chief  of  
Staff  (CoS) who read the whole document first, highlighting relevant 
material for himself  and the Company level.
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Chief  of  Staff  creates Company Warning Order 
The WO was too detailed for Company level, so some editing by 
CoS was necessary, as well as the inclusion of  some additional mate-
rial to clarify the anticipated task requirements. 
Send Warning Order to Companies 
The modified and edited WO was then sent to the companies below 
the Battle Group, so that they would have advanced notice of  the 
intention of  the orders when they arrived. This gives them an oppor-
tunity to prepare in advance of  the actual orders.
Create planning timeline
The CoS created a planning timeline for the production of  a plan 
to defeat an assault team that had parachuted into their area. There 
were 2 hours available to construct the plan (from 1300 to 1500), 
which allotted approximately 17 minutes per question (of  the 
Combat Estimate’s 7 questions) as shown in Appendix Figure 1. The 
planning timeline was drawn on a flip chart. The Combat Estimate 
is a planning process that has been developed over decades and is 
described in more detail in The Combat Estimate book issued by 
the Command and Staff  Trainer organization at the Land Warfare 
Centre in Warminster, UK (2007). The Combat Estimate has 7 main 
questions to guide planners through the process, namely:
Q1. What is the enemy doing and why?
Q2. What have been I told to do and why?
Q3. What effects do I want to have on the enemy and what direc-
tion must I give to develop my plan?
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Q4. Where can I best accomplish each action/effect?
Q5. What resources do I need to accomplish each action/effect?
Q6. Where and when do each of  the actions take place in rela-
tion to each other?
Q7. What control measures do I need to impose?
The activities that were observed in answering each of  these ques-
tions are presented.
Q1. What is the enemy doing and why? 
Question 1 was undertaken by the Engineer and the Intelligence 
Officer, in parallel with Question 2. Key terrain features were 
marked on a transparent overlay placed on top of  a map (such as 
slow-go areas like forests and rivers), as were the approximate dis-
position of  the enemy forces and likely locations (using translucent 
stickers with the standard military symbols on them, from APP-6A 
to NATO standardization agreement on military symbols for Land 
Based Systems), potential avenues of  approach, and likely Courses 
of  Action (CoA). An example is shown in Appendix Figure 2. In this 
case, it was thought that the enemy assault force was likely to try and 
meet up with the main armored forces approaching from the West. 
The enemy had landed in an area surrounded by forest which gave 
them some protection, although it was thought that they had not 
landed where they intended. 
Q2. What have I been told to do and why? 
The CoS interpreted the orders from Brigade together with the 
Battle Group commander to complete the Mission Analysis. Each 
line of  the orders was read and the specified and implied tasks were 
8       The International C2 Journal | Vol 4, No 3
deduced. These were written by hand onto a whiteboard as shown 
in Appendix Figure 3. The Commander’s Critical Information 
Requirements (CCIRs, which are linked to the Decision Points in 
Questions 4 and 5) and Information Requests (IRs) were identi-
fied and noted for each task, when appropriate. When the CCIRs/
IRs had been derived, the CoS read them off  the Mission Analysis 
whiteboard (expanding where necessary to improve intelligibility) to 
a clerk who typed them directly onto the Requests For Information 
(RFI) sheet. The requests were radioed up to Brigade and the 
responses were tracked on the whiteboard.
Q3. What effects do I want to have on the enemy?
The Battle Group Commander then drew his required effects onto 
a flip chart as shown in Appendix Figure 4. Three effects were 
placed above the planning line (SCREEN, CLEAR, and DEFEAT) 
and four effects were placed below the planning line (SCREEN, 
DEFEAT, GUARD, and DEFEND). The two SCREEN effects were 
placed to prevent the enemy from the West coming to the aid of  the 
group who were being attacked. The CLEAR effect was intended to 
remove any enemy from the forest, if  they were there. The DEFEAT 
effect was intended to incapacitate the enemy. 
Q4. Where can I best accomplish each action/effect?
The CoS and Battle Group Commander worked on three CoAs to 
achieve the Commander’s effects as shown in Appendix Figure 5. 
This was a very quick way to propose and compare three potential 
CoAs in response to the Battle Group Commander Effects Schematic 
(remembering that the planning timeline only allowed 17 minutes 
for each of  the 7 questions of  the Combat Estimate). Meanwhile the 
Engineer took the Battle Group Commander’s Effects Schematic 
and put the Effects onto the ground, using an acetate sheet on a 
paper map. Each Effect became either a Named Area of  Interest 
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(NAI) or a Target Area of  Interest (TAI). Decision Points (DP) were 
placed between NAIs and TAIs. The resultant overlay is called the 
Decision Support Overlay (DSO) as shown in Appendix Figure 6. It 
is worth noting that it took approximately 15 minutes to construct 
the DSO on the TALC (by the Engineer).  
Q5. What resources do I need to accomplish each action/effect? 
The Engineer then constructed the Decision Support Overlay 
Matrix (DSOM) on paper, taking the NAIs, TAIs, and DPs from the 
paper map and linking them to each other, their location and pur-
pose, and the asset that would be used to achieve the effect. There 
is a clear link between the NAIs, TAIs and on the hand-written flip 
chart, as shown in Appendix Figure 7. The manual production of  
the DSOM on the paper flip chart offers a process of  checking the 
logic of  the DSO, making sure that the NAIs, TAIs, and DPs link 
together and that the assets are being deployed to best effect (i.e., 
relating each asset to a purpose as the columns are next to each 
other in the flip chart version of  the DSOM). 
Q6. When and where do the actions take place in relation to each other? 
The CoS led the discussion of  how the force elements would move 
together through the battle (through a mixture of  forward recce 
[reconnaissance], mounted and dismounted troops, and armored 
vehicles) with logistical support and coordinated indirect fire ahead 
of  them (controlled by the fire control lines—see Q7). This was 
enacted on the map from the start position to the end position to 
capture the synchronization issues as shown in Appendix Figure 8, 
which were recorded onto the Coordination Measures whiteboard as 
shown in Appendix Figure 9. The coordination measures were used 
as a precursor to the construction of  the synchronization matrix.
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Q7. What control measures do I need to impose? 
The fire control measures were developed by the Battle Group 
Commander, to ensure that the indirect fire ordinance would not be 
placed on the advancing force elements, or beyond the boundaries 
of  the Battle Group’s area. Five fire control lines were drawn onto 
an overlay on the paper map and numbered one to five. Each line 
was given a name, which was entered into the staff  officer’s note-
book against the number used on the overlay as shown in Appendix 
Figure 10. The convention of  naming phase lines was to ensure 
coordination between the force elements and indirect fire during the 
operational phase. These activities form the battle plan for the Battle 
Group. This plan is turned into orders for each of  the Companies the 
Battle Group is directing. Any minor changes to the plan, such as a 
delay in the timings or a reallocation of  a unit (which might become 
apparent from the updated CCIRs), will mean that a Fragmented 
Order (FRAGO) is issued to the relevant Company.
Analysis of  observed vignette and comparison of  media 
used 
The record of  the media used in this vignette is presented in Table 1, 
which indicates a variety of  media including paper, maps, overlays, 
whiteboards, flip charts and staff  notebooks (i.e., the shaded cells 
in Table 1). Observation of  the planning process suggests that the 
Combat Estimate method, media and products work well together. 
The plan was constructed within the 2 hour time frame, with only 
17 minutes per question, and the staff  officers had no difficulty using 
the conventional media. No difficulties were noted working between 
public and private artifacts, such as taking the effects schematic (Q3) 
from the flip chart and CoA (Q4) from the flip chart to produce the 
DSO (Q5) on an overlay. Similarly there were no problems noted for 
taking the DSO (Q5) from the overlay to produce the DSOM (Q6) 
on a flip chart. The point here is that translation between the media 
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was straight-forward, as all media and products were available for 
the staff  officers to use at all times. The planning media and meth-
ods were not seen as a constraint on the planning process.
Table 1. Public and private artifacts used during the planning 
process
Media/ 
Products 
 
Paper 
(private) 
 
Maps/ 
Overlays 
(public) 
Whiteboard 
(public) 
Flip Chart 
(public) 
Staff 
Notebook 
(private) 
Warning Order      
Planning Time Line      
Q1. BAE/TI      
Q2. Mission Analysis      
Q2. CCIRs/RFI      
Q3. Effects Schematic      
Q4. COA      
Q4. DSO      
Q5. DSOM      
Q6. War-game      
Q6. Co-ordination      
Q7.  Fire Control       
The optimal choice of  type and mode of  communication within 
and between the cells in a HQ is likely to be heavily dependent on 
the activity conducted. For some activities a textual document or a 
graphical image is more appropriate than a spoken alternative or 
vice-versa. The stage of  any activity is also likely to heavily influence 
the optimal communication approach. Table 2 shows the degree of  
collaboration and cooperation required for different stages of  the 
planning process. There is a clear divide; the latter stages of  the 
process (Q4-Q7) are best supported by collaboration (actors working 
individually with shared information). The earlier stages are much 
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better suited to cooperative activity where the actors work together 
on one single product. Walker et al. (2009) report on the basic 
human communication structures seen inside a BG HQ, identifying 
eight key functions, some of  which are comprised of  further sub-
functions. The eight key functions include the Higher Command 
Formation, the Battle Group Commander (CO), Chief  of  Staff  
(CoS/2IC), the Principal Planning Staff  such as the IO/G2 (to vary-
ing extents it also requires the participation of  individual roles such 
as Recce/ISTAR, Eng, A2/Log and Arty/AD. There are also other 
ancillary command staff  (such as those responsible for more general 
tasks and information management), which are called sub-units in 
the HQ (who typically carry out activities live in the battlespace) 
and, finally, the collection of  graphics and planning aids derived 
from the Combat Estimate (artifacts that represent and transform 
information in some manner). 
Walker et al. (2009) describe the human network as dynamic with 
different functional nodes and links becoming active under differ-
ent activity stereotypes. The activity stereotypes that they identi-
fied were: providing direction (i.e., the Battle Group Commander 
directing communications and information outwards to subordinate 
staff  in a prescribed and tightly coupled manner); reviewing (i.e., the 
planning/principal staff  communicate in a more collaborative man-
ner with mutual exchange of  information and ad-hoc usage of  plan-
ning materials and outputs); and semi-autonomous working (i.e., the 
headquarters staff  are working individually on assigned tasks and 
become relatively loosely coupled in terms of  communication). 
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Table 2. Team work required for each stage of  the planning process
Digital MP/BM Estimate Question Task work or team work 
Q1.  What is the enemy doing and why? Cooperative activity around the 
table between Intelligence, ISTAR 
and Engineers 
Q2.  What have I been told to do and why? Isolated intellectual activity by chief 
of Staff followed by collaborative 
activity around the table with other 
staff officers 
Q3.  What effects do I want to have on the enemy? Isolated intellectual activity by the 
Commanding Officer followed by 
cooperative activity around the 
table with all Staff Officers 
Q4.  Where can I best accomplish each action/effect? 
Q5.  What resources do I need to accomplish each action/effect? 
Q6.  Where and when do the actions take place in relation to each other? 
Q7.  What control measures do I need to impose? 
Collaborative activity in which the 
products are shared between Staff 
Officers led by the Chief of Staff 
(often the Commanding Officer is 
physically absent but keeps in touch 
via radio communications) 
  
The communication channels remain open but used in an ad-hoc, 
unprescribed manner). These basic structures account for most of  
the formal communications. The human network structure is com-
plex, but some of  the links are identified in Figure 2.
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Figure 2.  Interaction processes between the cells in Battle Group 
Head Quarters during mission planning
As Table 2 and Figure 2 indicate, mission planning is a collaborative 
(i.e., working together on planning products) and cooperative (i.e., 
working in parallel on planning products) process, both in terms of  
the contribution to the products and the verbal interactions. It is also 
very obvious that the planning team surrounds themselves with the 
public planning artifacts. Maps, overlays, whiteboards, and flip charts 
adorn every surface. The plan is constructed in the physical space 
between these artifacts, as information is collected, transformed and 
integrated from the cognitive artifacts and the interactions between 
the members the planning team. The training that planners undergo 
reinforces the fact that the information needs to be public, for all to 
see and interact with. In addition, discussion around the artifacts are 
also public for all in the planning cell to hear. The public nature of  the 
artifacts and discussions is created the conditions for stolen knowledge 
as proposed by Brown and Duguid (1996), i.e., people working in the 
periphery can pick-up on what is going on and use the information 
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in their own work practices. This implicit participation in the plan-
ning process can be very beneficial, for the efficient use of  informa-
tion transmission and identification of  possible confounds. It was 
sometimes observed that someone in the periphery would point out 
a false or incorrect assumption from overhearing or overlooking the 
public information. The planning process appears to focus on iden-
tifying the constraints (such as the mission, the enemy, the environ-
ment, the resources, and assets) to help define the possible courses of  
action. The process also requires an understanding of  enemy doc-
trine and tactics to anticipate their likely behavior and responses as 
well as military experience to know what effects are likely to achieve 
the desired outcome. Although it is difficult to quantify, there is cer-
tainly the opportunity for creativity in the way in which the plan is 
constructed. The planning teams are continually trying to identify 
ways in which they can get the most from their finite resources and 
assets as well as preventing the enemy from anticipating their strat-
egy. The planning process is also required to be flexible, because it 
is continuous—as the process of  issuing FRAGOs suggests. While 
there hasn’t been space to discuss the interaction between plan-
ning and operations, these two cells are tightly coupled, as opera-
tions ensure planning and re-planning are being undertaken in light 
of  the operational demands and constraints. The importance of  
these issues is mirrored by the Human Factors research literature. 
Easily interpretable artifacts enable a common interpretation across 
the team. Such common knowledge, or team schemata, is key for 
effective team performance (Langan-Fox et al. 2001). In addition to 
being an important aspect of  team performance, team schemata are 
also tightly coupled to distributed situation awareness (Wilson et al. 
2007), itself  a core aspect of  effective teamwork (Salas et al. 1995). 
Appropriate team schemata allow teams to engage in effective col-
laborative and cooperative behaviors (Rasker et al. 2000; Paris et 
al. 2000; Wilson et al. 2007). Additionally team schemata allow for 
adaptivity and agility within teams (McCann et al. 2000). 
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Implications for digitization
Moves have been made to develop digital systems to support the 
planning processes (see Riley et al. 2006 and Roth et al. 2006 for 
two examples). The focus of  these activities has been on the products 
of  the planning process for distribution between the planning team 
and to other people in the network within the HQ. The challenge to 
system designers has been to preserve the collaborative, public, and 
creative parts of  the planning process as well as supporting different 
levels of  plan fidelity (which will depend on the time available to 
develop the plan). Perhaps the biggest challenge is to decide what 
needs to be digitized and what form this digitization should take. 
Given that military planning teams have invested considerable effort 
in developing and refining their planning skills using the traditional 
media, it would seem appropriate to try and support these activities 
rather than requiring them to develop a new set of  skills. The plan-
ning process has evolved over centuries of  refinement and improve-
ment (Clausewitz 1832). Roth et al., argue that much insight may be 
gleaned from studying the work-arounds and home-grown cognitive 
artifacts that are being used by command and control teams (such 
as the so-called cheat-sheets and sticky notes). The traditional analog 
planning process (as described earlier) is certainly abundant with 
potential metaphors, such as overlays, stickies, routes, CoAs and so 
on. It is worth considering if  the conventional media could be cap-
tured digitally (by camera, scanner, or other means) if  they need to 
be transmitted as electronic documents with orders or reports, or 
for wider distribution. As a general design principle, the production 
of  electronic documents should be at least as easy as the production 
of  their analog equivalents. Baxter (2005) is wary of  the inexorable 
trend to digitize and concerned by the history of  technology failing 
to deliver expected benefits, this is not just linked to military experi-
ence (Stanton and Marsden 1996; Sinclair 2007). Baxter argues that 
very few people understand the interrelated issues for technology, 
operations, and human factors (being conversant in just one of  these 
topics is not sufficient). 
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Transformational approaches are likely to cause more problems than 
they solve. There are concerns that digitization will lead to additional 
emergent work (Kuper and Giurelli 2007), both in terms of  increasing 
the amount of  direct work required as well as the work associated 
with operation of  the digital tools. The emergent nature of  the task-
artifact cycle has been described by Carroll (2000). Certainly it will 
not be possible to predict all the ways in which any future system 
would be used, so it is important to make the system as flexible as 
possible so that users may adapt it to suit their purposes (Roth et al. 
2006). Kiewiet et al. (2005) noticed that there are marked differences 
in the planners’ domain knowledge, pointing out that group plan-
ning ensures an integrated approach rather than an overemphasis 
on one planner’s area of  strength. The social aspect of  planning has 
not been lost on other researchers (Houghton et al. 2006; Stanton et 
al. 2006; Walker et al. 2006; Jenkins et al. 2008). The collaborative 
aspects of  planning seem to be a key to successful mission planning. 
As in the observational case study reported in this article, Riley et al. 
(2006) identified different cells contributed to the planning process, 
such as intelligence, operations, logistics, fire support, engineering 
and air defense. Kuper and Giurelli (2007) argue that design of  col-
laborative tools to support command and control teams is one of  
the keys to effective team work. The case study presented by Riley 
et al. (2006) shows how Human Factors can contribute to the design 
of  a mission planning system which is based on a thorough under-
standing of  the planning process, the demands and constraints. In 
design of  their prototype tools they stress the need to provide a quick 
visualization of  the plan and the current situation. This enables the 
current operational picture to be compared with the plans, which 
may require changes to the plan as the situation changes (Stanton 
et al 2008a; Stanton et al. 2008b). The aim of  this article was to 
understand the demands and constraints placed on the people and 
technology in pursuit of  their work, and therefore help design sys-
tems that are more appropriate. From these observations two core 
issues have arisen:
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• Artifacts currently used within the planning process are simple 
and easily understandable ensuring simple interpretation.
• These artifacts are publically available, allowing collaborative 
and cooperative planning processes to occur. 
These issues should be explored thoroughly before undertaking a 
digitization of  the planning process. 
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Appendix
Appendix Figure 1.  Planning timeline on a flip chart
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Appendix Figure 2.  Threat integration on map and overlay
Appendix Figure 3.  Mission Analysis on a whiteboard
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Appendix Figure 4. 
SCREEN 
effect
Planning
line
CLEAR
effect
DEFEAT
and GUARD 
effects
DEFEND
effect
DEFEAT
effectSCREEN 
effect
 Effects Schematic drawn on a flip chart and laid 
on the map
Appendix Figure 5. 
Chosen
CoA
 Effects CoAs developed on a flip chart
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Appendix Figure 6. 
SCREEN 
effect
CLEAR
effect
GUARD
effect
DEFEND
effect
DEFEAT
effect
 DSO on map and overlay
Appendix Figure 7.  DSOM on a flip chart
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Appendix Figure 8.  Coordination of  force elements on map and 
overlay via a wargame
Appendix Figure 9.  Coordination Measures captured on a 
whiteboard
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Appendix Figure 10. 
Staff
Officer’s 
notebook 
Fire Control 
lines
 Fire control lines on map and overlay also 
recorded in staff  officer’s notebook
